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In a laboratory experiment we show that minimum wages have significant
and lasting effects on subjects’ reservation wages. The temporary introduction of
a minimum wage leads to a rise in subjects’ reservation wages which persists even
after the minimum wage has been removed. Firms are therefore forced to pay
higher wages after the removal of the minimum wage than before its introduction.
As a consequence, the employment effects of removing the minimum wage are
significantly smaller than are the effects of its introduction. The impact of mini-
mum wages on reservation wages may also explain the anomalously low utiliza-
tion of subminimum wages if employers are given the opportunity to pay less than
a minimum wage previously introduced. It may further explain why employers
often increase workers’ wages after an increase in the minimum wage by an
amount exceeding that necessary for compliance with the higher minimum. At a
more general level, our results suggest that economic policy may affect people’s
behavior by shaping the perception of what is a fair transaction and by creating
entitlement effects.
I. INTRODUCTION
For decades, economists have been interested in the eco-
nomic and social consequences of minimum wage laws. Important
puzzles remain, however, despite much progress in both labor
market theory and empirical analysis. First, several studies re-
port anomalously low utilization of subminimum wages in situa-
tions where employers could actually pay workers less than the
minimum [Freeman, Wayne, and Ichniowski 1981; Katz and
Krueger 1991, 1992; Manning and Dickens 2002]. Katz and
Krueger [1992] found, for example, that the introduction of the
opportunity to pay subminimum wages to youth had no discern-
ible effect on teenage workers’ wages. This underutilization of the
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opportunity to pay less than the prevailing minimum occurred,
even though the vast majority of firms paid a starting wage below
the new hourly minimum immediately before it became effective.
Second, there is evidence that minimum wage laws have so-called
spillover effects [Card and Krueger 1995; Katz and Krueger 1992;
Dolado, Felgueroso, and Jimeno 1997; Teulings 2003; Teulings,
van Dieten, and Vogels 1998].1 For example, Katz and Krueger
[1992] and Card and Krueger [1995] show that after an increase
in the minimum wage, fast food restaurants increased wages for
workers by an amount in excess of that necessary for compliance
with the higher minimum wage. Third, the new minimum wage
research in the 1990s questioned the conventional wisdom that
increases in the legal minimum wage always cause a decrease in
employment, in particular, if the minimum wage increase is
modest [Card 1992; Card and Krueger 1994; Katz and Krueger
1992; Machin and Manning 1994; Dolado et al. 1996]. Although
these results remain contested, it is probably fair to say that they
represent a considerable challenge to the conventional view of the
employment effects of minimum wages (see, e.g., Neumark and
Wascher [1992, 2000], Card, Katz, and Krueger [1994], and Card
and Krueger [2000]).
Why do profit-maximizing employers not take advantage of
the possibility of reducing wages below the legal minimum, and
why do they pay more than the required minimum for those
workers who earned less than the new minimum wage before it
was introduced? We report the results of laboratory experiments
that examine possible driving forces behind these phenomena in
this paper. We provide, in particular, evidence showing why
profit-maximizing employers may find it profitable to pay workers
much higher wages after the removal of a legal minimum wage
than before its introduction.2 This result provides a possible
explanation for the anomalously low utilization of subminimum
wage opportunities because these opportunities were typically
introduced after a previous increase in the minimum wage. In
addition, our data show why profit-maximizing employers may
find it optimal to pay wages above the minimum wage even if they
paid wages much lower than the minimum wage before its intro-
1. A notable exception is the United Kingdom where no spillover effects have
been found [Manning and Dickens 2002].
2. Throughout the paper we use the term “employer” or “firm” for subjects
who are in the role of an employer in the laboratory experiment. The term
“worker” is used for subjects who are in the role of a worker in the experiment.
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duction. This result provides an explanation for the second puz-
zle, i.e., why there are wage spillover effects. Finally, we report
evidence suggesting that employers may find it optimal neither to
decrease employment after the introduction of a binding mini-
mum wage nor to increase employment after its removal.
We identify the observed pattern of reservation wages as the
driving force behind all these phenomena. Workers’ fairness con-
cerns shape individual reservation wages in our experiment and
give rise to upward sloping labor supply schedules at the firm
level. We observe that the minimum wage strongly affects reser-
vation wages, suggesting that it influences what is perceived as a
fair wage. After the introduction of a minimum wage, workers’
reservation wages increase, and a substantial share of the work-
ers even exhibits reservation wages above the legal minimum.
Profit-maximizing firms are thus forced to pay wages above the
minimum, which explains the spillover effect.3 After the removal
of the minimum wage, workers’ reservation wages decrease some-
what; however, they still substantially exceed those before the
introduction of the minimum wage. It seems that the minimum
wage leads to a kind of ratchet effect in workers’ perception of
what constitutes a fair wage. This means that individual firms
face a tighter labor supply schedule after the removal of the
minimum wage than before its introduction. Therefore, the pay-
ment of substantially higher wages after the removal of the
minimum wage than before the introduction is a profit-maximiz-
ing strategy. This finding explains why firms may find it unprof-
itable to utilize subminimum wage opportunities and echoes re-
sults reported in Katz and Krueger [1992]. They report that 62
percent of fast food restaurant managers not using the submini-
mum opportunity for youth believed they could not “attract quali-
fied teenage workers at the subminimum wage” although the vast
majority of these restaurants hired workers at less than the new
minimum wage prior to its increase.4
3. Flinn [2005] shows that minimum wages can also affect workers’ reserva-
tion wages in search and matching models with wage bargaining. The reason is
that the minimum wage changes the asset values of unemployment and employ-
ment. However, as firms and workers are exogenously rematched in every period
of our experiment, these effects cannot play a role in our setup. Teulings [2005]
provides an elegant explanation of spillover effects in an extended competitive
model. Teuling’s explanation and our explanation in terms of changes in reserva-
tion wages are not mutually incompatible.
4. The fact that reservation wages and, hence, actual wages remain high
after the removal of the minimum wage may also inform us about the forces
behind the adjustment of reservation wages over time. Our result suggests that
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The pattern of reservation wages also shapes the employ-
ment effect of the minimum wage. Since workers’ fairness con-
cerns impose an upward sloping labor supply constraint on indi-
vidual firms, firms can increase employment if they pay higher
wages. Theoretical analyses [Rebitzer and Taylor 1991; Manning
1995, 2003; Burdett and Mortensen 1998; Bhaskar and To 1999]
indicate that a minimum wage may actually increase employ-
ment under these circumstances. This is, however, not obvious in
our context. As the minimum wage not only increases wages but
also reservation wages, firms may also reduce employment. We
find that the increase in reservation wages is not strong enough
such that the introduction of a binding minimum wage has a
positive net effect on employment. In addition, the asymmetric
response of reservation wages to the introduction and the re-
moval of the minimum wage is associated with asymmetric em-
ployment effects: employment decreases less after the removal of
the minimum wage than it increased after the introduction of the
minimum wage.5
To what extent should one expect the behavioral forces iden-
tified in the experiment to be present in labor markets outside the
laboratory as well? Although it is advisable to be cautious when
generalizing findings from one empirical domain to another, we
believe that the impact of minimum wages on reservation wages
might well be present in labor markets outside the laboratory.
First, fairness concerns, which shape reservation wages in our
experiment, have been shown to affect laboratory behaviors even
at rather high stake levels—up to three months’ income [Cam-
eron 1999; Slonim and Roth 1998; Fehr, Fischbacher, and Tou-
gareva 2002]. Thus, the argument that stakes are higher in the
“field” than in the laboratory and that the laboratory results can
therefore be dismissed as irrelevant, is on weak ground. Second,
the argument that we used a rather narrow subject pool—stu-
dents—in our experiment is also not compelling because evidence
actual wage payments which were previously experienced may strongly shape
reservation wages. This finding may have important consequences for the debate
regarding the compatibility of the “wage curve,” as documented by Blanchflower
and Oswald [1994], and the Phillips curve. In particular, one condition for the
compatibility of the wage curve approach with the Phillips curve approach is that
past increases in real wages be fully reflected in current increases in reservation
wages [Blanchard and Katz 1997, 1999].
5. Similar to our findings Kramarz and Philippon [2001] report for the
French labor market between 1990 and 1998 that the effects of labor cost in-
creases and decreases caused by legal changes were not symmetric.
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from representative experiments from Germany, the Nether-
lands, and Switzerland show that the basic behavioral patterns
observed in fairness-related experiments with students also pre-
vail in representative samples [Bellemare and Kro¨ger 2004; Fehr
et al. 2002; Falk and Zehnder 2006]. Third, evidence from ques-
tionnaire studies with firms’ human resource managers—some of
them even with representative samples of firms—suggests that
workers’ fairness concerns play a prominent role in firm’s wage
policies [Bewley 1999; Agell and Bennmarker 2003]. Finally, re-
cent papers indicate that laboratory measures of social prefer-
ences can be good predictors of behavior in field settings. Karlan
[2005] shows that reciprocity (i.e., trustworthiness) in trust
games predicts subjects’ loan repayments one year after a labo-
ratory experiment, and Carpenter and Seki’s work [2005] sug-
gests that laboratory measures of conditional cooperation forecast
productivity in the workplace.
At a more general level, our results indicate that economic
policies may not only affect private agents’ incentives, but also
change their perception of what is fair and create entitlement or
status quo effects. In the past, economists have concentrated
their efforts on understanding the incentive effects of government
policies. However, our results—in combination with other recent
evidence [Madrian and Shea 2001; Ariely, Loewenstein, and
Prelec 2003] demonstrating that seemingly innocuous situational
details can have powerful behavioral effects—suggest that econo-
mists may gain substantially by also focusing their research on
these other effects of government policies. The work by Ariely,
Loewenstein, and Prelec [2003], for example, shows that arbi-
trary anchors have strong effects on subjects’ reservation prices.
If arbitrary anchors are even able to affect reservation values,
should we not also expect a government intervention as strong
and as salient as an increase in minimum wages to influence
reservation wages strongly? Thus, public policies are likely to
affect behavior not only through changing incentives but also by
shaping perceptions of entitlements and, thus, reservation
values.
In the following, we first present our experimental design.
Then we show our results in Section III. In Section IV we examine
the extent to which the impact of minimum wages is due to the
fact that minimum wages are necessarily a kind of wage guide-
line; we thus study the impact of nonbinding wage guidelines on
actual wages and reservation wages in this section. Section V
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discusses the applicability of our findings to labor markets out-
side the laboratory and suggests several further experiments that
might provide a deeper understanding of the minimum wage’s
impact on reservation wages.
II. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
In this section we present the experimental design. We first
describe the experimental game, followed by a description of the
treatments and procedures. Finally, we discuss the behavioral
predictions.
II.A. The Experimental Game
Workers are randomly matched to firms in each period of the
experiment, and can only conclude a contract with the firm with
which they are matched. There are six firms and eighteen work-
ers in each experimental session; i.e., each of the six firms is
randomly matched with three workers in each period. Firms have
identical revenue functions with labor as the only variable input
and a decreasing marginal revenue product of labor. To hire
workers, firms can submit a unitary wage offer w to the matched
workers; i.e., wage discrimination is ruled out. Firms can make
wage offers to all matched workers or to fewer workers. Workers
do not know how many wage offers the firm makes; each individ-
ual worker only knows whether he or she received a wage offer.
A worker can accept or reject w. If the worker rejects w, he or
she is unemployed and earns nothing in this period. If a worker
accepts the offer, a binding contract is concluded; the worker
receives w, and the firms’ revenue increases according to the
marginal revenue the worker generates. Each firm’s revenue
function is shown in Table I. Firms’ profits are given by total
TABLE I
FIRMS’ REVENUE FUNCTION
Employed workers Total revenue Marginal revenue
0 0 –
1 390 390
2 740 350
3 1000 260
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revenue minus wages. Thus, an individual firm’s profit function is
as follows:
Firm 
0, if no worker is employed
390w, if one worker is employed
740 2w, if two workers are employed
1000 3w, if three workers are employed.
Workers’ payoffs depend on the wage offer and on whether the
offer is accepted or rejected. Thus, payoffs for workers are
Worker  0, if no wage offer is received0, if a wage offer is rejected
w, if a wage offers is accepted.
Both workers’ and firms’ payoff functions are common knowledge
among the participants. After all decisions in a period are made,
payoffs are calculated and displayed on the subjects’ computer
screens: firms are informed both about their own payoffs and
those of the workers with whom they have been matched; work-
ers, too, are informed both about their own payoffs and that of
their firm. The next period begins after all subjects have received
this payoff information.
Since we were particularly interested in workers’ individual
reservation wages, we used the strategy method to elicit workers’
acceptance decisions. To this end, workers were asked to indicate
the lowest wage they would in fact be willing to accept before they
knew which wage offer they actually received. If the wage offer
actually received was lower than the worker’s acceptance thresh-
old, the offer was automatically rejected; otherwise it was ac-
cepted. Note that the specification of an acceptance threshold
determined a worker’s complete strategy, because the worker
implicitly stated his accept/reject response to every possible wage
offer. Neither the firms nor the other workers were informed
about an individual workers’ acceptance threshold. A firm was
only informed about how many workers accepted its wage offer.
The acceptance threshold represents a worker’s reservation
wage. This information about reservation wages will prove useful
for understanding the firms’ behavioral responses to the intro-
duction and the removal of minimum wages. In addition, the
information about reservation wages enables us to implement a
useful matching procedure. A large body of evidence now indi-
cates that a significant share of experimental subjects exhibit a
preference for fairness and reciprocity [Camerer 2003; Fehr and
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Ga¨chter 2000]. In addition, the strength of fairness motives dif-
fers among those subjects who care for fairness. Therefore, we
expected both a significant share of the workers to exhibit posi-
tive reservation wages as well as heterogeneity in these reserva-
tion wages. This means that—on average—firms face an upward
sloping labor supply schedule. Thus, if we play the experiment for
a very large number of periods, firms are likely to learn the
distribution of reservation wages, enabling them to respond ap-
propriately to this distribution.
However, repeating the same experiments for very many
periods has also the drawback that subjects become bored or that
their concentration diminishes over time, increasing the random-
ness of their behavior. Therefore, we only repeated each treat-
ment condition for fifteen periods and increased the probability of
a firm receiving a representative draw of matched workers by
implementing the following matching protocol. We partitioned
workers according to their reservation wage into three groups of
equal size in each period such that there was a group with high,
a group with intermediate, and a group with low reservation
wages. The random matching ensured that each firm faces one
worker from each group. We conjectured that, regardless of the
behavioral equilibrium (i.e., the stable behavioral pattern) in our
setting, this matching protocol would speed up adjustment to-
ward this stable pattern.
II.A. Treatments and Treatment Orders
To study the economic effects of a legally binding minimum
wage, each session contains two treatments: a treatment without
a minimum wage (NO) and one with a minimum wage (MW).
Both treatments are played for fifteen periods. The minimum
wage is set at a level of 220; i.e., firms cannot offer wages below
220 in the MW treatment. Therefore, the range for permissible
wage offers for firms is defined as follows: the constraint 0  w 
1000 prevails in the NO treatment, while wage offers have to obey
220  w  1000 in the MW treatment. We implemented two
treatment sequences to study potential sequence effects. In five
sessions, subjects first completed the NO and then the MW treat-
ment. The treatment order was reversed in the other five
sessions.
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II.B. Subjects, Payments, and Procedures
All subjects were students of the University of Zurich or the
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (ETH). Each subject
participated in only one session. Subjects were randomly subdi-
vided into two groups before the start of the experiment; some
were assigned the role of a firm and others the role of workers.
The assigned roles remained fixed for the whole session. All
interactions were anonymous, i.e., the subjects did not know the
personal identities of their trading partners.
To make sure that subjects fully understood the procedures
and the payoff consequences of the available actions, each subject
had to read a detailed set of instructions before the session
started. Participants then had to answer several questions about
the feasible actions and the payoff consequences of different ac-
tions. We only started a session after all subjects had correctly
answered all questions. The exchange rate between experimental
currency units (“points”) and real money was 150 Points  1
Swiss Franc (US $ 0.80).
The computerized experiment was programmed and con-
ducted with the experimental software z-Tree [Fischbacher
1999]. We had 24 subjects (six firms and eighteen workers) in
each of the ten sessions, yielding a total of 240 participants in the
experiment. A session lasted approximately two hours and sub-
jects earned on average 49 Swiss Francs (CHF 49  US $ 40).
II.C. Behavioral Hypotheses
If we assume common knowledge of rationality and money-
maximizing behavior, the predicted results of this experiment are
straightforward. Since the outside option is zero, selfish workers
accept every wage offer above or equal to zero, which the firms
anticipate. Thus, firms offer a wage of one (or zero) to all three
workers in a subgame perfect equilibrium of the NO treatment,
and the workers accept.6 Full employment thus results, and firms
reap almost all gains from trade. Firms cannot offer wages below
220 in the MW treatment due to the existence of a legal minimum
wage, although workers would be willing to accept the same low
6. Every strategy combination of the following form is a subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium: the firm offers a wage of one to all three workers, at least one
worker accepts only positive wage offers, and the other workers accept all non-
negative wage offers. Additionally, there is also another subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium, in which every worker accepts all nonnegative wage offers and
therefore the firm offers a wage of zero.
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wages as in the NO treatment. Since the minimum wage is less
than the third worker’s marginal product, profit-maximizing
firms offer the minimum wage to all three workers. As in the NO
treatment, all workers are employed. A further implication of
common knowledge of rationality and selfishness is that the
treatment order does not affect the predicted behavior in any
treatment. We summarize the most important predictions of this
approach as the
SELF-INTEREST HYPOTHESIS.
(a) Wages will be zero or one in the absence of a mini-
mum wage and equal to 220 in the presence of the minimum
wage. The treatment order does not affect wages in either
treatment.
(b) Reservation wages are zero or one in the absence of a
minimum wage and do not exceed 220 in the presence of the
minimum wage, irrespective of the treatment order.
(c) Full employment prevails in both treatment conditions.
As mentioned previously, however, there is considerable evidence
for the existence of heterogeneous preferences for fairness and
reciprocity. These preferences imply that a person is willing to
sacrifice material payoff in order to punish either unfair behavior
or unfair people, or to move payoffs closer to equality. In our
context, for example, a worker could punish a firm for offering a
low wage by rejecting the latter’s offer. Such rejection behaviors
have been frequently observed in the ultimatum bargaining game
[Gu¨th, Schmittberger, and Schwarze 1982; Camerer 2003]. The
equal split between the proposer and the responder is the salient
(fair) reference point in this two-player game, and the responder
often rejects low (unfair) bargaining offers, although this means
that he earns nothing. To avoid rejections, the proposers typically
offer on average between 70 percent and 80 percent of the equal
split [Camerer 2003; Fehr and Ga¨chter 2000]. Thus, in our con-
text, if firms anticipate that some workers will reject low offers,
they also have an incentive to increase their wages beyond those
the self-interest model predicts. Moreover, the existence of het-
erogeneous fairness preferences, in combination with restricted
mobility of workers across firms, also means that firms do not face
a flat, but an upward sloping labor supply schedule.7
7. We believe that some restrictions on workers’ mobility also prevail in field
settings because of the many frictions that are present in real world labor mar-
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In the absence of precise knowledge about the distribution of
fairness preferences in our subject pool, it is difficult to make
precise quantitative predictions. However, one might speculate
that—similar to the ultimatum game—firms will distribute the
available revenue such that workers earn 70 percent to 80 per-
cent of the equal split. If a firm employs three workers, the
available revenue is 1000, and the equal split implies a wage of
250. Thus, if workers receive on average 70 percent to 80 percent
of the equal split, the average wage should be between 175 and
200. If this conjecture holds true, the minimum wage will also
increase actual wages in the presence of fairness preferences.
For our purposes, it is important whether fairness prefer-
ences are based solely on the allocation of final payoffs across
firms and workers—as in models of inequity aversion [Fehr and
Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000]—or whether they are
also shaped by beliefs about other players’ intentions [Rabin
1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004; Falk and Fischbacher
forthcoming]. The difference between these two approaches can
be nicely illustrated in the context of a simplified ultimatum
game where the proposer only has two ways of dividing up a
bargaining cake of $10 [Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher 2003]: In the
“fair” condition, the proposer can only offer 5:5 (5 for herself and
5 for the responder) or 8:2. In the “unfair” condition the proposer
can only offer 8:2 or 10:0. If the responder only cares about the
final allocation of payoffs, the rejection rate of the 8:2 offer should
be identical across both conditions. However, an offer of 8:2 in the
“fair” treatment reveals that the proposer is very unfair because
she could have offered 5:5. In contrast, an offer of 8:2 in the
“unfair” treatment does not reveal an unfair intention because
the only alternative was 10:0. In fact, the rejection rate of the 8:2
offer is 44 percent in the “fair” treatment and only 9 percent in the
“unfair” treatment in the Falk et al. [2003] experiments, indicat-
kets. Mobility costs and search costs in a world of imperfect information may well
generate upward sloping labor supply schedules for individual firms. Manning
[2003], for example, provides substantial evidence in favor of this view. In addi-
tion, a simple thought experiment suggests that the labor supply schedule indi-
vidual firms face is not completely flat: do we expect all employees to quit if a firm
cuts all wages by 1 percent? The likely answer to this question is “no,” and
therefore, the labor supply schedule is likely to be upward sloping. The real
question, therefore, is how strongly individual firms’ labor supply schedules are
upward sloping. Empirical evidence alone, and not assumption, can answer this
question.
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ing that the set of feasible alternatives affects the responders’
fairness attributions and hence their rejection behavior.
These findings suggest that the minimum wage is also likely
to affect the workers’ fairness perceptions and, hence, their res-
ervation wages in our experiment. A wage of 220, for example,
may be perceived as very fair in the absence of a minimum wage
because the firm also could have offered much less, whereas a
wage at the legal minimum of 220 may be perceived as rather
unfair in the MW treatment because the firm was forced to offer
that wage anyway. Evidence in favor of this view comes from
Brandts and Charness [2004] who introduced a minimum wage in
the context of a labor market with worker moral hazard where
workers’ fairness concerns drive effort. They show that workers
provide less effort for the same wage level in the presence of the
minimum wage, lending support to the view that the impact of
minimum wages on workers’ attributions of fairness intentions to
firms partially shapes their effort responses. Workers cannot
choose an effort level in our experiment, but they can choose their
reservation wages according to their fairness perceptions.
Note, however, that none of the models mentioned above,
based on the idea that attributions of fairness intentions shape
behavior, predict asymmetrical rejection behavior in response to
the introduction and the removal of a minimum wage. According
to these models, if the minimum wage is abolished, it will no
longer affect workers’ attributions of fairness intentions to firms.
In view of these considerations we can now formulate the
FAIRNESS HYPOTHESIS.
(a) Wages will be much higher than zero in the absence
of the minimum wage. The introduction of a legal minimum
wage further raises actual wages, and the removal of the
minimum wage reduces wages. Actual wages before the in-
troduction and after the removal of the minimum wage law
are indistinguishable.
(b) The introduction of a legal minimum wage raises
reservation wages, and the removal of the minimum wage
decreases reservations wages. Reservation wages before the
introduction and after the removal of the minimum wage are
indistinguishable.
(c) Underemployment may occur already in the absence
of a minimum wage and minimum wages generate ambigu-
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ous employment effects; i.e., employment may increase, de-
crease, or remain unaffected.
Part (c) of the fairness hypothesis follows from the assumption of
heterogeneous fairness preferences. If this assumption holds, in-
dividual firms face upward sloping labor supply schedules which
may render it optimal to offer wages some workers reject. It is
also well-known (see, e.g., Bhaskar and To [1998] or Boal and
Ransom [1997]) that increases in the minimum wage may not
reduce but increase employment under these circumstances be-
cause the hiring of additional workers can only be accomplished
in the absence of a minimum wage if all workers’ wages increase.
Minimum wages may also have this effect in our experimental
setting. Depending on the level and the degree of heterogeneity in
reservation wages, hiring fewer than three workers may be profit-
maximizing. For example, if reservation wages of the three
matched workers are (0, 10, and 100), hiring three instead of two
workers produces marginal costs of 3  100  2  10  280,
which exceeds the third worker’s marginal revenue, which is only
260. It is therefore optimal for the firm to hire two instead of three
workers in this case. The introduction of a minimum of 220
reduces the marginal cost of labor from 280 to 220, which is less
than the third worker’s marginal revenue. Thus, hiring all three
workers may be profitable in the presence of the minimum wage
if the legal minimum leaves reservation wages unaffected or does
not affect them very strongly.
However, if minimum wages cause a strong enough increase
in reservation wages, it is also possible that firms reduce employ-
ment. If, for example, the distribution of reservation wages is (30,
80, 130) before the introduction of the minimum wage, the mar-
ginal cost of employing the third worker is given by 3 130  2 
80  230 which is below the third worker’s marginal revenue.
Therefore, a profit-maximizing firm employs all three workers. If
the minimum wage shifts the distribution of reservation wages to
(30, 80, 240), the marginal cost of the third worker equals 3 
240  2  220  280 which exceeds the revenue produced by the
third worker. Thus, the minimum wage lowers employment in
this case. These examples illustrate that much depends on the
concrete distribution of reservation wages and on the quantita-
tive impact of minimum wages on reservation wages. No concrete
quantitative employment predictions are possible in the absence
of knowledge about these characteristics of the distribution.
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III. RESULTS
In this section we present our main results. We concentrate
on the economic effects of introducing a minimum wage in sub-
section III.A. We start by reporting how the minimum wage
regime affects wages. These results are subsequently explained
in the light of workers’ reservation wages. Next we investigate
and explain the employment effects of introducing a minimum
wage. We analyze the effects of a removal of minimum wages on
wages and employment in subsection III.B. Special emphasis is
given to potential asymmetries. We explore whether the impact of
a minimum wage is affected by the treatment sequence, i.e.,
whether we consider the introduction sequence or the removal
sequence.
III.A. Introducing the Minimum Wage—Effects on Wages,
Reservation Wages, and Employment
Our first result concerns the wages paid to workers in the
introduction sequence where the minimum wage is initially ab-
sent and introduced in the second phase of a session. The main
findings can be summarized as follows:
RESULT 1 (wages). In the absence of a minimum wage law, wages
are much higher than predicted by the self-interest model;
however, the vast majority of wages is below the minimum
wage level of 220. Nevertheless, in the presence of a mini-
mum wage law, the majority of wages is not just raised to the
level of the minimum wage but above that level.
This result is consistent with part (a) of the fairness hypothesis.
Support for Result 1 comes from Figure I and regression (1) of
Table II. Figure I shows a histogram of all wages paid to workers,
both in the NO and the MW conditions, with wage intervals in
steps of 10. As is obvious from this figure, wages in the NO
condition (gray bars) are much higher than the self-interest
model predicts. On average, firms pay wages of 188, and the
standard deviation is 32.1. The lowest wage paid in the NO
condition is 25, and more than 94 percent of all wage payments
are equal to or above 150.
Figure I also shows that wages increase substantially after
the introduction of the minimum wage (black bars). The average
wage in the MW condition is 237.7 with a standard deviation of
11.1. The treatment differences in wages are highly significant, as
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can be inferred from regression (1) of Table II. We regress wages
on a minimum wage dummy, which takes the value one if the
observation comes from the MW treatment and zero otherwise.8
TABLE II
EFFECTS OF INTRODUCING A MINIMUM WAGE ON WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT
Dependent variable: (1) wage (2) employment
Minimum wage dummy 50.11 .291
(7.46) (.048)
Constant 187.58 2.10
(8.38) (.078)
Number of observations 2021 900
Prob  F .003 .0038
R2 .533 .0357
OLS estimation with robust standard errors clustered on sessions in parentheses.  indicates signifi-
cance at the 1-percent level. The minimum wage dummy is 1 if a minimum wage exists and 0 otherwise.
FIGURE I
Distribution of Wages in the Absence and the Presence of a Minimum
Wage (Minimum wage is introduced in the second phase of a session.)
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The coefficient of the minimum wage dummy is positive and
significant at any conventional level. Figure I illustrates a further
interesting observation. Note that many wages in the MW condi-
tion exceed 220, the level of the minimum wage. Only 7 percent of
all wages are exactly at the level of the minimum wage, all other
wages are higher than 220. This “spillover” effect of minimum
wages is remarkable, since the minimum wage was binding in the
sense that without the minimum wage, only 8 percent of the wages
were above 220. Put differently, while 92 percent of the wages
were below 220 before the introduction of the minimum wage,
firms subject to the minimum wage regime pay wages above 220
in 93 percent of the cases.
Result 1 raises two important questions: 1) Why do wages
attain their high level in the absence of a minimum wage law? 2)
Why do wages exceed the minimum wage in the presence of the
law? Part (b) of the fairness hypothesis provides answers to both
of these questions. The hypothesis in part (b) predicts that work-
ers’ fairness preferences cause reservation wages that are sub-
stantially above zero and the introduction of the minimum wage
is predicted to cause a further rise in reservation wages. This
change in reservation wages may then induce firms to pay wages
above the minimum wage. Our next result shows whether we
indeed observe these predicted regularities in reservation wages.
RESULT 2 (reservation wages). In the absence of the minimum
wage law, individual reservation wages are much higher
than the self-interest model predicts, but almost all of them
are below the minimum wage level of 220. However, in the
presence of the minimum wage law, a large share of the
subjects exhibit reservation wages above the minimum wage
level.
Support for Result 2 comes from Figure II which shows a histo-
gram of stated reservation wages in the NO condition (gray bars)
and the MW condition (black bars). Reservation wage intervals
are in steps of 10. Figure II reveals that only about 8 percent of all
reservation wages are between 0 and 10 in the NO condition; i.e.,
only a small minority of workers chooses reservation wages close
to the level the self-interest model predicts. In contrast, more
8. Since observations within a session may be dependent, all reported robust
standard errors are clustered on sessions. This holds for all regressions in this
paper.
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than 82 percent of the chosen reservation wages are at least 100,
66 percent are at least 150, and 28 percent are 200 or higher.
However, only 9 percent are equal to or higher than the later
minimum wage of 220. The resulting mean reservation wage is
145.
The distribution of reservation wages in the NO condition is
consistent with the fairness hypothesis. Workers with high ac-
ceptance thresholds could earn much more if they were willing to
reduce their thresholds. This can be shown empirically by re-
gressing the workers’ earnings on their reservation wages. This
results in a strongly negative relationship in the NO condition,
with a “reservation wage coefficient” of .499 and a t-statistic of
15.6 (OLS regression with robust standard errors, clustering on
sessions). Apparently, many workers are willing to accept the
costs of rejecting low offers.
Figure II also shows that the introduction of the minimum
wage affects reservation wages. While 91 percent of the reserva-
FIGURE II
Distribution of Reservation Wages in the Absence and the Presence of a
Minimum Wage (Minimum wage is introduced in the second
phase of a session.)
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tion wages are below the minimum wage level in the NO condi-
tion, 49 percent of reservation wages exceed the minimum wage
in the MW condition. This result suggests that minimum wages
systematically affect what is considered to be a fair wage. Many
workers seem to perceive a wage of 220, which would have been
considered as fair and quite generous in the NO treatment, as
unfairly low in the MW treatment. As mentioned above, fairness
preferences may make it profitable for the firms to pay relatively
high wages in the NO treatment, while the change in reservation
wages due to the minimum wage law may make the payment of
wages above the minimum wage in the MW treatment profitable.
To check this conjecture, we computed the firms’ profit-maximiz-
ing wages across treatments and for each session, given the
workers’ observed reservation wage schedule. Remember that
three workers are assigned randomly to each firm at the begin-
ning of a period. After indicating their reservation wages, the
workers are subdivided into three groups: a low (l), a medium (m),
and a high (h) reservation wage group. Subsequently, each firm is
randomly matched with one worker out of each of these three
groups. Assuming that firms know the distribution of reservation
wages, they choose their wage offers in order to maximize the
following expected payoff:9
(1) E[F(w)] pl(w)  390 pm(w)  350 ph(w)  260
 [pl(w) pm(w) ph(w)]  w,
where pi is the probability that a worker in the reservation wage
group i  {l,m,h} accepts the offered wage. Accordingly, the first-
order condition is
(2)
	E[F
w]
	w 
	pl(w)
	w  390
	pm(w)
	w  350
	ph(w)
	w  260
 	pl(w)	w  	pm(w)	w  	ph(w)	w ]  w
 [pl(w) pm(w) ph(w)] 0.
9. To a first approximation, the proposers in the ultimatum game typically
make offers that maximize their expected monetary earnings. For example, the
modal offer was close to the offer that maximized the proposers’ expected earnings
in each of the four countries in which Roth et al. [1991] conducted ultimatum
games. Therefore, we assume that firms in our setting maximize their expected
monetary payoff.
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The profit-maximizing wage w* equalizes the marginal reve-
nue of a higher offer with its marginal cost. As in a standard
monopsony problem, the marginal cost of a wage increase not
only consists of the wage multiplied by the expected change in
employment, but also includes the additional wage costs for the
expected employment realized at the previous wage level.
Given the actual distribution of reservation wages in the
experiment, it is possible to calculate the profit-maximizing wage
and employment for each firm in each period.10 Table III shows
the average of the resulting profit-maximizing wage offers to-
gether with average wages actually realized for each session in
the NO and the MW treatment. This table reveals several inter-
esting findings. First, the profit-maximizing wage across sessions
in the NO condition lies between 151 and 189. This explains our
finding that wages greatly exceed the low level the self-interest
model predicts. Second, on average, firms pay wages that closely
approximate profit- maximizing wages. The relative differences
between profit-maximizing and actual average wages per session
are between 0.29 percent (Session 4) and 8.7 percent (Session 5).
This suggests that firms well understood the monopsonistic prof-
it-maximization problem. Third, the correlation between the
means of the profit-maximizing and realized wages across ses-
sions is positive and significant (Spearman’s rho  .900, p 
.0374). This shows that firms not only understood the maximiza-
tion problem but also responded to the session-specific distribu-
10. We calculate the wage that maximizes expected profits in each period of
every session, given the matching procedure described above and assuming that
firms have perfect knowledge about the distribution of workers’ reservation
wages.
TABLE III
PROFIT-MAXIMIZING WAGES AND ACTUAL WAGES IN THE ABSENCE AND PRESENCE OF
A MINIMUM WAGE
Minimum wage absent Minimum wage present
Session number S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S1–5 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S1–5
Profit-maximizing
wage 177 183 151 189 184 177 233 227 237 238 232 233
Actual wage 165 172 154 189 200 176 234 228 237 238 243 236
The table shows averages for the individual sessions S1, S2, . . . , S5 as well as for all sessions together
(S1–5). In these sessions the minimum wage was introduced in the second phase of a session.
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tion of reservation wages. This is quite remarkable, given that
firms were not informed about the distribution of reservation
wages but had to discover it in a trial and error process. Fourth,
Table III shows that, as a consequence of the increase in reser-
vation wages in the MW condition, profit-maximizing wages in
fact exceed 220. This provides an explanation for the spillover
effect reported in Result 1, i.e., the fact that firms pay wages in
the MW condition that are not only higher than those in the NO
condition, but also in excess of 220. Moreover, the difference
between profit-maximizing and actual wages is rather small, as it
is in the NO condition, indicating that firms well understood the
optimization problem. The relative difference between profit-
maximizing and actual wages is in most sessions below 1 percent
in the MW treatment.
In Section II we argued that firms may not be willing to
employ all three matched workers when reservation wages are
heterogeneous. Figure II shows that workers exhibit a consider-
able degree of heterogeneity with respect to their reservation
wages in the NO condition. As firms’ wage offers are close to
optimal (see Table III), it is therefore likely that employment is
lower than predicted by the self-interest model. In principle, the
introduction of a minimum wage could therefore lead to an in-
crease in employment, because firms in the MW condition are
exogenously forced to pay a minimum wage far above the ob-
served average wage level in the NO condition. However, we also
know that minimum wages lead to a considerable increase in
reservation wages so that workers reject wage offers under a
minimum wage regime that they would have accepted in the
absence of a minimum wage law. Depending on the strength of
each effect, the minimum wage law can therefore increase or
decrease employment. Result 3 summarizes our findings concern-
ing the employment effects of the introduction of a minimum
wage:
RESULT 3 (employment). Employment in the absence of the mini-
mum wage is much lower than the self-interest model pre-
dicts. The introduction of minimum wages causes a signifi-
cant increase in employment. However, due to the increase in
workers’ reservation wages, the employment effect of the
minimum wage is smaller than it would have been had work-
ers’ reservation wages remained stable.
Support for Result 3 comes from regression (2) in Table II where
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we regress firm level employment on a constant and a dummy for
minimum wages. Regression (2) shows that employment is
clearly below the level predicted by the self-interest hypothesis in
the NO condition. Instead of three workers, 2.1 workers are
employed on average. In fact, employment per firm does not
exceed 2.4 in any single session of the NO treatment. The reason
for why firms employ fewer than three workers has to do with the
level and the heterogeneity of workers’ reservation wages. The
reason for the low employment level is not that firms submit too
few job offers. In fact, firms submit three job offers in 96.2 percent
of the cases. However, 28.9 percent of the offers are turned down
on average.
The minimum wage dummy in regression (2) also indicates
that the introduction of the minimum wage increases employ-
ment per firm by roughly 0.3 workers (14 percent)—from 2.1
workers per firm in the NO treatment to 2.4 workers per firm in
the MW treatment. The positive employment effect of minimum
wages occurs in each of the five sessions and is likely to be a
consequence of firms’ optimal wage policy. In a previous version of
this paper [Falk, Fehr, and Zehnder 2005] we explicitly compared
profit-maximizing employment levels—given the observed distri-
bution of reservation wages—and actual employment levels. In
each session profit-maximizing employment and actual employ-
ment is higher in the presence of a minimum wage.
III.B. Removing the Minimum Wage—Economic Effects and
Asymmetries
Up to this point, we have studied the economic effects of
introducing a minimum wage. In the following, we explore the
minimum wage effects on wages and employment when the mini-
mum wage is removed rather than introduced. In particular, we
will focus on the question whether the economic effects are sym-
metrical; i.e., whether the treatment order affects the treatment
effects. Since the treatments (NO and MW) are exactly the same
regardless of the treatment order, one would expect that remov-
ing the minimum wage causes the same absolute changes in
wages, reservation wages, and employment as the introduction of
the minimum wage. In fact, the fairness hypothesis predicts that
the effect of the minimum wage on these variables is the same
regardless of the treatment order. Results 4, 5, and 6 show,
however, that these predictions are not consistent with the data.
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RESULT 4 (asymmetry in wages). The temporary introduction of
the minimum wage has permanent effects on actual wages,
i.e., even after the removal of the minimum wage, actual
wages remain close to the previous minimum wage level.
Thus, pre- and post-minimum wage economies exhibit signif-
icantly different wages, although the two economies are iden-
tical in all exogenous parameters.
Support for Result 4 comes from Figures III and IV and from
regression (1) in Table IV. Figure III shows employed workers’
average wages over time for both treatments in both sequences.
The solid line shows wages for the introduction sequence; the
dashed line shows wages for the removal sequence. Wages in the
MW treatments of both the removal and introduction sequences
are very similar. In the removal sequence, 11 percent of the paid
wages are exactly at the level of the minimum wage, while 89
percent of the wages are higher. In the introduction sequence, 7
percent of the paid wages are exactly at the level of the minimum
wage, while 93 percent of the wages are higher. This shows that
the spillover effect described in Result 1 appears, regardless of
whether we introduce the minimum wage at the beginning of the
FIGURE III
Average Wages of Employed Workers in Different Treatment Sequences
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experiment or after subjects experienced an economy without the
minimum wage. In addition, the mean wage is exactly 237.7 in
both sequences. While wages in the MW conditions are identical,
wages in the NO conditions differ substantially. Whereas before
the introduction of the minimum wage the mean wage in the NO
treatment (see subsection III.A) is equal to 188, mean wages
remain at 213 after removal of the minimum wage. Thus, the
previous minimum wage strongly affects wages in the NO condi-
tion of the removal sequence. Further evidence for this result is
found in Figure IV, which displays the distribution of wages in
the NO conditions of both treatment sequences. Our results show
clearly that high wages (above 200) are chosen much more fre-
quently in the NO treatment after the removal of the minimum
wage than before its introduction. The results of regression (1) in
Table IV further support this, showing that the wage difference
between the introduction and the removal sequence is highly
significant. Wages are regressed on a minimum wage dummy, a
dummy for the removal sequence, and the interaction of the two.
The minimum wage dummy takes the value one if the observa-
FIGURE IV
Distribution of Wages before the Introduction and after the Removal of the
Minimum Wage
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tion comes from the MW treatment and zero otherwise. Likewise
the dummy for the removal sequences takes the value one if the
observation comes from the removal sequence and zero otherwise.
Finally, the interaction variable “minimum wage dummy 
dummy for the removal sequence” is an interaction term of these
two dummy variables. Since we omitted the dummy for the in-
troduction sequence, the constant in this regression measures the
average wage in the NO treatment of the introduction sequence.
The minimum wage dummy measures the wage increase due to
the minimum wage in the introduction sequence. It is positive
and significant. The dummy for the removal sequence measures
the difference in actual wages in the NO condition across treat-
ment sequences. The coefficient of this dummy indicates that
wages in the NO condition are 25.7 units higher after the removal
of the minimum wage law than before its introduction. The in-
teraction term measures the difference in the minimum wage
effect across sequences. The coefficient of the interaction term is
significantly negative, indicating that the impact of the minimum
wage on actual wages is smaller in the removal sequence than in
the introduction sequence. Thus, the results of the regression
indicate that a minimum wage law has lasting effects on actual
wages even after the removal of the law.
Why do firms pay higher wages after the removal of the
minimum wage than before its introduction? A key factor in
answering this question is the impact of minimum wages on
reservation wages.
RESULT 5 (asymmetry in reservation wages). Reservation wages
are higher after the removal of the minimum wage than
before its introduction.
Support for Result 5 comes from Figure V. It shows the distribu-
tion of reservation wages in the two NO conditions, i.e., before the
introduction (gray bars) and after the removal of the minimum
wage (black bars). The figure reveals that the relative frequency
of high reservation wages is much higher after the removal of the
minimum wage. While only 28 percent of the reservation wages in
the NO treatment are 200 or higher in the introduction sequence,
this number is 52 percent in the removal sequence. For wages
above or equal to 220, the respective numbers are 9 and 23
percent.
Figure V also shows that very low reservation wages are
chosen more frequently after the removal of the minimum wage.
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While in the introduction sequence only 10 percent of the stated
reservation wages are below 30, this is the case for 17 percent of
the reservation wages in the removal sequence. Taken together,
these observations lead to the following aggregate picture: the
average reservation wage is 145 before the minimum wage is
introduced and 157 after its removal. The respective median
values are 150 and 200. The big difference between median and
average values comes from the shift at the lower end of the
reservation wage distribution. While the small increase in very
low reservation wages strongly influences the average reserva-
tion wage in the removal sequence, this change does not affect the
median. However, the probability of being assigned a worker with
a very low reservation wage remains rather small for firms; thus,
the data on average reservation wages are likely to underesti-
mate the economic impact of the former minimum wage on actual
wages in the NO condition of the removal sequence. The change
in medians, therefore, better captures the likely economic rele-
vance of the increase in reservation wages for the formation of
actual wages; the medians suggest that reservation wages are
FIGURE V
Distribution of Reservation Wages before the Introduction and after the
Removal of the Minimum Wage
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strongly influenced by the previous minimum wage law. The
results of regression (2) and (3) in Table IV further support the
finding that the previous minimum wage law affects reservation
wages in the NO condition. In regression (2), reservation wages
are regressed on a minimum wage dummy, a dummy for the
removal sequence, and the interaction of the two. The same
regression model is employed in regression (3) for medians of
reservation wages per period, session, and treatment. The con-
stant measures the reservation wage in the NO treatment of the
introduction sequence. The dummy for the removal sequence
measures the difference between the reservation wages in the NO
treatments across sequences. The coefficient of this dummy is
positive in both regressions, but only significant in regression (3):
median reservation wages are thus significantly higher in the
postminimum wage economy than in the preminimum wage
economy.
The sum of the dummy for the removal sequence and the
interaction term measures the difference in the two MW condi-
tions.11 In both regressions, the effect is basically zero (11.70 
11.75  0.05, respectively, 26.67  27.47  0.8) and insignifi-
cant (F-Test for the hypothesis that the sum of the dummy for
removal sequence and the interaction term equals zero, p 0.709
and p  0.713, respectively), which indicates that the treatment
sequence does not affect reservation wages in the MW conditions.
So far, we have shown that the minimum wage continues to
affect the distribution of reservation wages after its elimination.
However, the question remains open whether this effect should
change the wage-setting behavior of profit-maximizing firms. We
calculated the profit-maximizing wages given the different distri-
butions of reservation wages before the introduction and after the
removal of the minimum wage. Our calculations show that it was
indeed optimal for firms to pay different wages in the pre- and the
postminimum wage economy. When we aggregate, we get a mean
(median) profit-maximizing wage of 184 (200) for all NO sessions
of the removal sequence compared with 177 (180) for all NO
sessions in the introduction sequence, respectively. The same
11. Intuitively, this claim holds for the following reason. The MW dummy
takes on a value of one in the MW condition of the introduction sequence, while all
three dummy variables in the regression take on a value of one in the MW
condition of the removal sequence. Thus, the difference between the MW condi-
tions in the two different sequences is represented in the regression by the
situation where the dummy for the removal sequence and the interaction term
take on a value of one.
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calculations for the MW treatments reveal that there are no
differences between the two sequences. Mean (median) profit-
maximizing wages are 233 (230) for the MW sessions in the
introduction sequence and 231 (230) for the MW sessions in the
removal sequence. These calculations are in line with the fact
that wages in the MW treatments are practically identical, re-
gardless of the sequence of treatments.
Next, we examine whether the asymmetric response of wages
and reservation wages also led to an asymmetric response in
employment.
RESULT 6 (asymmetry in employment). The introduction of the
minimum wage causes significantly larger employment
changes than its removal. In particular, the introduction
causes a significant increase in employment, whereas the
removal leaves employment basically unchanged.
Regression (4) in Table IV shows that the employment effects of
the minimum wage differ significantly between the introduction
and the removal sequences. The significantly positive coefficient
of the minimum wage dummy indicates that employment in-
creases after the introduction of the minimum wage. Recall that
the interaction term measures the difference in the effect of
minimum wages across sequences. Thus, the negative coefficient
of this term indicates that the employment effect of the minimum
wage is smaller in the removal sequence than in the introduction
sequence. Finally, the regression also shows that there is no
significant difference in employment between the NO and the
MW treatments in the removal sequence because the sum of the
minimum wage dummy and the interaction term are close to zero
and insignificant (0.291  0.258  0.033, F-Test for the hypothe-
sis that the sum of the minimum wage dummy and the interac-
tion term equals zero, p  0.464).12
IV. SOURCES OF THE MINIMUM WAGE EFFECT
One of our most important findings concerns the impact of
the minimum wage on workers’ reservation wages. Workers be-
12. The sum of the minimum wage dummy and the interaction term gives us
the difference between the NO condition and the MW condition of the removal
sequence for the following reason: all three dummy variables in the regression
take on a value of one in the MW condition of the removal sequence, while only the
dummy for the removal sequence takes on a value of one in the NO condition of
this sequence.
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haved as if they perceived the same wage to be less fair after the
introduction of the minimum wage because they rejected wage
offers that they had previously accepted. Therefore, the minimum
wage seems to affect workers’ views of what constitutes a fair
wage. If this conjecture is true, then other interventions that
change workers’ fairness perceptions may have similar effects. In
particular, nonbinding wage guidelines may also raise workers’
reservation wages if they are set above the wage that previously
prevailed. In many economies, employer or employee organiza-
tions or government institutions sometimes propose wage guide-
lines. We conducted further control sessions to examine the con-
jecture regarding the effects of wage guidelines. Subjects in these
sessions first experienced the situation without a wage guideline
(and without minimum wages) for fifteen periods, after which we
introduced the guideline. The level of the wage guideline was set
at 220—the level of the minimum wage in the previous sessions.
Like the minimum wage, the guideline was common knowledge
among the subjects, and it was made clear that the guideline only
constituted a nonbinding rule about the lower bound of firms’
wage offers.
We conducted two sessions with wage guidelines. Figure VI
shows that the introduction of the wage guideline increased res-
ervation wages considerably. The average reservation wage with-
out the guideline is 115, whereas the mean reservation wage with
the guideline is 154. The proportion of observations at 200 and
220 is much higher with the wage guideline. However, we observe
almost no reservation wages above 220 in the presence of the
wage guideline. Thus, although the guideline raises reservation
wages, the increase is smaller than after the introduction of a
binding minimum wage because 49 percent of the stated reser-
vation wages were even above 220 in the latter case (see Figure
II). The increase in reservation wages is also associated with an
increase in actual wages. The average wage in the treatment
without the guideline is 175, while average wages are 206 in the
guideline treatment—a rise of 31 units. Recall from subsection
III.A that the introduction of a minimum wage increased wages
by 50 units. Thus, a nonnegligible part of the wage increase
legally binding minimum wages cause may be attributed to the
guideline effects of minimum wages. The change in employment
rounds up the effects of wage guidelines. Average employment
per firm is 2.21 without the guideline, whereas average employ-
ment increases to 2.47 in the presence of the guideline. Thus, as
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in the case of a legally binding minimum wage, the wage increase
the guideline causes seems to ease firms’ labor supply constraint
and contributes to a higher employment level.
V. SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATION
Almost all economic reasoning is based on the assumption
that changes in the incentives people face are the predominant
cause in behavioral changes. Therefore, economic policy analysis
focuses on how policy shapes incentives. However, the results of
this paper suggest that economic policies have deeper effects.
Subjects in our experiments exhibited higher reservation wages
after the introduction of a minimum wage, suggesting that mini-
mum wages affect their fairness perceptions. A wage once con-
sidered fair may no longer be perceived as such after the intro-
duction of a minimum wage. Moreover, we observe that reserva-
tion wages remain higher after the removal of the minimum wage
than before its introduction. One reason for this asymmetry may
be that the minimum wage, or the high wages associated with its
FIGURE VI
Distribution of Reservation Wages in the Absence and Presence of a
Nonbinding Wage Guideline
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existence, generates feelings of entitlement which persist after
the removal of a binding minimum wage. The individual per-
ceives entitlements as rights, associated with a motivational dis-
position to defend them [Schlicht 1998, p. 24]. Important sources
for entitlements are past allocations, which result in a “sense of
ownership in the status quo” [Zajac 1995, p. 121]. Applied to our
context, we speculate that once workers have been exposed to a
minimum wage, they become used to receiving a relatively high
wage. This experience may create entitlements, i.e., workers
think they have a right to receive high wages and are willing to
defend them. As a consequence, they set relatively high reserva-
tion wages even after the elimination of the minimum wage.
Although the introduction of a minimum wage also led to a
positive employment effect in our experiment, one should not
conclude from this that a positive employment effect will also
prevail in the real world because the number of firms was fixed in
our experiment. If we had allowed for the entry and exit of firms,
the employment effects might well have been negative because
the minimum wage decreased profits substantially. In addition, if
we had permitted endogenous investment choices, the profit-
decreasing effect of minimum wages would probably have re-
duced the capital stock and hence employment. Also, much de-
pends on the concrete quantitative details both in reality as well
as in our experiments, such as the slope of the labor supply
schedule. However, one robust implication for employment
emerges from the positive effect of minimum wages on reserva-
tion wages. This effect means that the standard approach—
which precludes an impact of minimum wages on the labor supply
schedule—may underestimate the negative employment effect of
minimum wages under competitive conditions. Likewise, labor
market models assuming monopsonistic competition may overes-
timate the positive employment effect of minimum wages if they
neglect that minimum wages tend to shift the labor supply curve.
In order to further assess the applicability of our findings to
situations outside the laboratory, it is also important to stress
that only vertical fairness concerns could play a role in our ex-
periment because all workers within a firm received the same
wage and they did not know the wages other firms paid. Thus, the
main fairness issue for an individual subject in the role of a
worker was how much he or she earned relative to the marginal
or the average product of labor. Fairness comparisons among
workers within the same firm may, however, play an even more
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important role for the impact of minimum wages on reservation
wages in real labor markets. Horizontal fairness concerns may be
a powerful force that may explain the anomalously low utilization
of subminimum wages because such concerns imply that workers
with similar tasks should be paid similar wages regardless of
whether the employer could pay a subminimum wage to some of
them. This conjecture is worth testing in future experiments by
implementing a minimum wage law that covers only part of the
workers. Likewise, fairness concerns among workers with differ-
ent jobs may generate spillover effects because the reservation
wage of more highly skilled workers may depend on the actual
wages of unskilled workers who earn more after an increase in
minimum wages. This conjecture could also be tested by assign-
ing different workers different productivities in the experiment.
Finally, it would be interesting to know how nonbinding mini-
mum wages or minimum wage laws that are incompletely en-
forced affect both reservation wages and actual wages. Our wage
guideline treatment was only a first step in this direction and
much remains to be done to fully understand the impact of mini-
mum wage laws on reservation wages. At a more general level, we
believe that research efforts that examine how economic policies
shape the perceived fairness of the interactions between private
agents and the perceived entitlements will have a high return
and may enable researchers to explain hitherto puzzling
phenomena.
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